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Abstract: The 50plus1-rule in German football is a controversially discussed institution that 
regulates investment behavior of professional football teams. This paper discusses from a 
sports economics perspective the suspected market failures that the 50plus1-rule is expected 
to prevent. To examine the effects of the regulation empirically, we gathered panel data on 47 
teams in the German Major League Football (“Erste Bundesliga”) from the seasons 1989/90 
until 2018/2019. Applying various approaches to measure financial and competitive imbal-
ance in the league, we derive a growing trend of imbalance since the introduction of the 
50plus1-rule. We employ a Difference-in-Differences approach to examine investment behav-
ior in budgets and sporting success between afflicted competitors and those exempted from 
the rule. Our results do not suggest any equalizing properties of the regulation. We find anti-
competitive effects and distorting properties of the regulation.  
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1. Introduction 
Professional and commercial sports leagues are special types of markets as they are regulated 
both by external institutions (general laws, usually enforced by public authorities) and market-
internal organizations and institutions. A league organization (either a sports association à la 
UEFA, IOC, FIA, etc., or a specific company like the Football Association Premier League 
Ltd (FAPL)) usually acts as a market-internal regulator, enforcing market-internal rules. A 
system of market-internal rules is necessary due to the specific character of sports leagues and 
championships like requiring common rules of the game, a common playing schedule, etc. 
(Neale, 1964; Késenne, 2007). In most commercial sports, the market-internal regulator acts 
as a monopolist due to the advantages of having one common institutional framework within 
which the teams or individuals can compete for the merits of being the best. However, such a 
monopoly regulator automatically enjoys considerable market power vis-à-vis the participants 
as well as upstream and downstream market players (Budzinski & Szymanski, 2015). Moreo-
ver, the regulator usually is not restricted to the rules of the game in a narrow sense but also 
extends its regulatory power to the commercial side of the league.1 A centralized sale of 
broadcasting rights as well as financial regulation of the budgets and investment behavior of 
the competitors within the league regularly raise antitrust concerns as they obviously influ-
ence the competition within the league (inter alia, Massey, 2007; Peeters, 2012; Budzinski, 
2018; Budzinski, Gaenssle, & Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, 2019). The regulation of the finances of 
the competitors by a market-internal monopoly regulator may serve the needs and best inter-
ests of the league as a whole (Schubert & Hamil, 2018). However, it may also anticompeti-
tively bias the sporting competition due to self-interest of the regulator or vested interests of 
particularly powerful participants (Budzinski, 2018).  
One example of such an institution is the so-called 50plus1-rule in German Football2. It regu-
lates investment behavior of clubs in the major league (“Erste Bundesliga”) as well as the 
lower league (“Zweite Bundesliga”) by limiting the amount of external capital investment a 
team can acquire: somewhat simplified, the original non-profit club must keep a minimum of 
“50 per cent plus 1” voting rights of the commercial/professional team playing in the league. 
                                                     
1  Even ostensibly sporting rules of the game may include a commercial dimension. For instance, the world 
football association (FIFA) introduced a new specification of the playing ball (making it harder to defend 
goals) for the 2010 football world championship in South Africa in order to make the games commercially 
more attractive through a higher number of goals. Furthermore, many sports regulators consider the effects 
on the television-attractiveness of their sports when adapting or changing sporting rules. 
2  Throughout this paper, we refer to football as the European-style football game, which is sometimes (mis-) 
labeled soccer. 
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Meanwhile, not all teams in the competition are affected by the 50plus1-rule, as exemptions 
exist. The rule may distort competition to the extent that the Federal Cartel Office of Germany 
is currently investigating the case (DFL, 2018; Reuters, 2018; TZ, 2019). Some competitors 
feel at a financial and sporting disadvantage and the granting of exemptions is controversial as 
well, e.g. the league repeatedly denied Martin Kind´s request to acquire majority stake in 
Hannover 96 in 2017-2019. However, even other league participants favor a deregulation on 
financial investments, as “the market would profit from liberalization”, as an official of FC 
Bayern München stated.3  
From a sports economics perspective, the core of the discussion is that, without this regula-
tion, a plethora of market failures would occur in German football leagues (Vöpel, 2009; 
Suliak, 2019; Bauers et al., 2020). In this paper, we critically review and discuss the occur-
rence of these market failures. We assess the effectiveness of the 50plus1-rule to prevent these 
market failures by empirically analyzing investment behavior of football clubs in the Bun-
desliga. More precisely, we answer the research questions (i) did the 50plus1-rule reduce fi-
nancial imbalances in the Bundesliga, (ii) did it decrease competitive imbalance, and (iii) did 
the exemptions distort competition in favor of the exempted competitors. Using a sample of 
30 seasons of the German Bundesliga (before and after the introduction of the rule), we find 
no evidence that the 50plus1-rule reduced financial or competitive imbalances. However, we 
do find indication for a distortive effect on competition. We conclude that the 50plus1-rule in 
its current form has anticompetitive effects.  
The paper is structured as follows: chapter 2 discusses the economic reasoning for regulatory 
interventions in football. Chapter 3 provides an empirical analysis of the effects of the 
50plus1-rule on competitive balance and financial imbalances as well as on performance dif-
ferences between ‘normal’ teams and such that were exempted from the rule. Chapter 4 dis-
cusses the implications from the empirical results in the context of the justifications of the 
50plus1-rule. Chapter 5 concludes. 
2. The Underlying Problems: In Need of Regulation? 
The league´s notion behind the rule was the limitation of external investments in the league in 
order to “keep the amount of outside capital in the system reasonably low” and “ensure a 
close connection to the grassroots level of the sport (amateur level), which is an essential val-
ue of the sport”4 (DFL, 2018). It is supposedly making the German Bundesliga “the most 
                                                     
3  Karl-Heinz Rummenigge in Deutsche Wirtschaftsnachrichten (2019), (translated by the authors). 
4  Jan F. Orth in Suliak (2019), (translated by the authors). 
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beautiful and thrilling league in Europe because of its existence”5. These goals should be 
achieved while protecting competition and having no distortive effects; the effects of the rule 
should actually be “as neutral to competition as possible” (DFL, 2018). The following section 
depicts the economic reasoning for regulatory interventions in football leagues on a general 
level, and is therefore not only relevant for the debate on the 50plus1-rule. However, the fol-
lowing reasonings are commonly used in the debate as justifications for the 50plus1 rule. 
 
2.1  Growing Financial Imbalances Jeopardize Competitive Balance 
The concepts of outcome uncertainty and competitive balance represent important corner-
stones of sport economic reasoning. Already the founding fathers of the discipline emphasized 
the uncertainty of outcome of sports contests as a major driving force of demand (Rottenberg, 
1956; Neale, 1964): according to this view, the uncertainty about who is going to win repre-
sents the fundamental entertainment value of attending and watching sports contests. There-
fore, the balance of competitiveness of the contestants (in short: competitive balance) is piv-
otal for the attractiveness and commercial appeal of sports contests. A long list of theoretical 
and empirical contributions dealt with the issues of outcome uncertainty and competitive bal-
ance since the founding days (recent overview: Pawlowski & Nalbantis, 2019). However, 
empirical evidence has been mixed at best and the injection of further theory elements like 
superstar theory (Kuypers, 1996; Falter & Perignon, 2000; García & Rodríguez, 2002; Berri 
& Schmidt, 2006; Simmons, 2006; Jewell, 2017), local hero and home winning preferences 
(Schmidt & Berri, 2001; Czarnitzki & Stadtmann, 2002), as well as insights from behavioral 
economics in general  (Coates, Humphreys, & Zhou, 2012; Pawlowski & Budzinski, 2013; 
Budzinski & Pawlowski, 2014) cast doubt on a simple and linear interrelation of competitive 
balance and demand or fan preferences, respectively. There seems to be a consensus, howev-
er, that some competitive balance is both in the commercial interest of a professional sports 
league and desired by consumers (fans). 
Among the driving-forces for competitive imbalance, financial imbalances play a prominent 
role. Higher budgets more often than not go along with more midterm sporting success (For-
rest & Simmons, 2002; Quitzau, 2003; Frick, 2005; Drut & Raballand, 2012; Wilkesmann, 
2014) – notwithstanding some prominent (mostly short-run) exceptions. Moreover, there is a 
self-reinforcing positive feedback loop at work: more sporting success usually implies win-
ning a higher price and enhances the chances to become popular with the fans, so that more 
                                                     
5  Hans-Joachim Watzke in Biermann (2012), (translated by the authors). 
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attendance follows as well as better sponsorship deals and higher merchandising revenues 
(Wilkesmann, 2014; Rohde & Breuer, 2016; Acero, Serrano, & Dimitropoulos, 2017). With-
out regulation, this self-reinforcing mechanism may drive growing financial imbalances that 
erode competitive balance – and, in the long run, may harm the commercial attractiveness of 
the sport in question. Therefore – and despite the ambiguous empirical evidence for the com-
mercial relevance of competitive balance considerations – many sports leagues and champi-
onship organizers enforce market-internal rules that re-allocate some revenues and thus aim to 
limit financial imbalances (recent overviews: Budzinski, 2018; Schubert & Hamil, 2018). 
Instruments include, inter alia, various types of revenue sharing arrangements and budget caps 
as well as diverse allocation schemes for common revenues (like television-broadcasting and 
streaming revenues). However, all these (market-internal) regulations may also distort and 
restrict competition and generate anticompetitive effects themselves (Budzinski, 2018). Gen-
erally speaking, it is not per se clear whether internal institutions targeting to combat financial 
imbalances promote or restrict competition on balance; in any case, they will usually not be 
neutral to competition. 
Limiting investment into competing clubs within a league may also target the prevention of 
financial imbalances and, therefore, address competitive balance considerations. If – and only 
if – financial imbalances are still limited (or under control by other regulatory instruments), 
restricting the access to capital markets and limiting financial inflows from investors may 
contribute to decelerating the natural trend towards financial imbalances. If contestants are 
relatively even budget-wise, a considerable investment into one contestant may yield relevant 
financial imbalances, creating a significant competitive advantage for this contestant irrespec-
tive of performance and talent (Lang, Grossman, & Theiler, 2011). However, if budgets al-
ready display imbalances that are beyond of what can be regained by performance-related 
income alone, then limiting investments may prevent catching-up investment which would be 
necessary to compensate the historical advantage of the former winners in order to improve 
competitive balance again (Budzinski, 2018). Those who propelled into superior budget vol-
umes by past success and the self-reinforcing mechanism described above may retain their 
sporting success not because of contemporary talent but purely because of financial ad-
vantages. Re-creating a level-playing field may then require externally-financed catching-up 
investments. Investment into one of the previously poorer clubs may intensify competition for 
the top positions (just like investments into Manchester City, Paris St. Germain or RB Leipzig 
have created new serious competitors for incumbents like Real Madrid, Manchester United or 
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FC Bayern München both in national and Europe-wide tournaments). Like any regulation, 
limiting investment into contestant may involve distortive, anticompetitive effects by cement-
ing the competitive order and erode options for taking competition to the leaders, thus pre-
serving their supracompetitive rents (Budzinski, 2018). 
Altogether, it matters whether and how a rule like the 50plus1-rule affects financial imbalanc-
es and competitive balance.  
 
2.2  Increasing Influence of External Financial Investors 
Next to (allegedly) amplifying financial imbalances, an increasing influence of external finan-
cial investors is often viewed to be a problem in itself (overview: Franck, 2010).6 The term 
“external” refers to people from outside the sport (the famous “oligarchs and princes”) and 
concerns relate to their motivation and influence on the matter of the sport. While sports clubs 
in Europe are usually viewed as being win-maximizers instead of profit-maximizers (Ké-
senne, 1996, 2007; Vöpel, 2011), the utility function of external investors may center around 
reputation effects, money laundering, publicity, empire building, or expensive hobbies (Conn, 
1998). Consequently, their goals may stand at crossroads with the goals of the sport insiders, 
for instance when it comes to investment into young player development and budding teams 
as well as support for the amateur elements of the sports system. Raising new talent is not 
only relevant for the attractiveness of the league in the long run; the importance of promoting 
home-grown talent also relates to the pivotal role of national teams in football including Eu-
ropean and world championships as well as Olympic-game tournaments. An additional con-
cern emphasizes the (lack of) long-run commitment to the sport: external investors with non-
sporting motives may quit very sudden and withdraw their investment unexpectedly or even 
mid-season.7 This may create negative externalities on other contestants and on the league as 
a whole if it jeopardizes match day schedules and distorts league structures. 
From an economic perspective, it is difficult to argue in favor of discriminating among inves-
tors according to alleged motives. First, it is notoriously difficult to identify these motives. A 
rich oligarch could still be a sports fan, for all that matters. Second, it would be naïve at best 
to claim that motives like reputation, publicity, or empire building are beyond sports-internal 
persons and do not exist or influence sport-“internal” procedures and decisions. The whole 
                                                     
6  For example “economically disadvantageous for the league as a whole”, Hans-Joachim Watzke in Biermann 
(2012), (translated by the authors). 
7  Although this is a common bargaining instrument, actual cases are rare, e.g. billionare Turki Al-Sheikh with-
drawing investments from Egyptian football team Pyramids FC (Youssef, 2018). 
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delineation between “internal” and “external” appears to be rather arbitrary. Third, the moti-
vation difference between investment in ownership and investment in sponsorship is blurry 
and ambiguous as well as is any attempt to delineate internal, “earned”, financial means from 
external, “not earned”, financial injections. A donation can come from a fan enthusiastically 
desiring to support his club or from a wealthy businessman looking for a new toy. Sponsor-
ship money can represent a sharp calculated advertising effort or be motivated by local patri-
otism and loyalty – or even driven by empire building desires of managers. Eventually, even 
taxpayer money can be injected to promote the local sports culture and competitiveness as 
well as the local economy and tourism – or to please sports fans and influential locals in order 
to maximize votes at the next election (Budzinski, 2018). Why should one motive to invest 
money into sports be allowed and the other not? How shall one reliably discriminate between 
different motives for investment? Shouldn’t this be done for motives of sports club members 
and buyers of sports club stocks as well? 
If “external” investment goes into ownership shares instead of into sponsoring, fears about 
sudden removal seem to be ambiguous as well. Selling ownership shares without significant 
losses versus terminating sponsorship contracts – it is not clear at all that one systematically 
happens more sudden and unexpected than the other one. 
With a view to the German Bundesliga, the German club structure needs to be considered. 
Germany has a tradition of sports clubs being nonprofit associations where virtually everyone 
can acquire membership, especially fans. In these clubs, voting rights are segregated and deci-
sion-making power considerably decentralized. On the one hand, this is not necessarily an 
efficient structure when it comes to running professional sports teams (Dietl & Franck, 2007; 
Rohde & Breuer, 2017), which is why 14 out of the current 18 Bundesliga clubs have orga-
nized their professional football department in some type of corporation outside but as a sub-
sidiary to the (umbrella) nonprofit association. “External” investors may now buy shares of 
this corporations and this investment is regulated by the 50plus1-rule (see chapter 3.1). On the 
other hand, preserving the decentralized ownership structures in the shape of the nonprofit 
membership clubs may represent a legitimate regulatory objective.  
 
2.3  Loss of Integrity of the Sport 
The protection of the integrity of the sport represents another reasoning which is difficult to 
define in a precise way. While the integrity of the sport normatively represents another legiti-
mate objective, it is empirically less clear whether the internal market regulators have the 
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same understanding of it as the consumers and fans. Actually, it is not even clear whether and 
how far consumers are valuing the integrity of the sport (Bauers et al., 2020). In connection 
with the preceding section, it may be understood to keep owners and generally influential in-
dividuals out of the sport that follow dubious motives. Here, the same reservations apply. 
A related line of reasoning refers to the commercialization of the sport, driving away more 
important values like solidarity among contestants or public interest, cultural value, and the 
passion of football (Walsh & Giulianotti, 2001). Investment regulation may decelerate further 
commercialization although it is unlikely to represent an effective protection against this on-
going process since commercialization is not only driven by investments but also by reaping 
monopoly rents in the collective sale of broadcasting and streaming rights, stimulating the 
merchandise boom, adjusting to sponsorship needs and wants, and many more channels. A 
very important question is whether commercialization benefits or harms fans (consumers). 
The available literature often focuses on stated preferences (i.e. surveys among football fans) 
and derives a general dislike of commercialization (Herberger, Oehler, & Wedlich, 2013; 
Lammert, Hovemann, & Bauers, 2018), which must be somewhat differentiated between 
hardcore fans (strong dislike) and casual fans (more ambiguous preferences). If true, commer-
cialization decreases fan interest in the sport and, thus, demand, harming the sport economi-
cally (Conn, 1998). These commercialization-critical preference statements from surveyed 
fans, however, stand in contrast to the revealed preferences (i.e. the actual demand behavior 
of fans) displaying an increasing demand of football despite its commercialization (see Fig. 
1). A striking example is the ever-increasing demand for merchandising products despite dras-
tic prices increases over the years.8 
 
                                                     
8  Even though it was deemed to the “epitome of commercialization” by fans, Iuventus Turin sold approx. 3 
Million Jerseys of Ronaldo within his first year with the club, gathering ~€300 Mio. in Revenue (Campbell, 
2018). The transfer fee was €112 Mio.  
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Fig. 1, Data from DFL (2020) 
Altogether, it appears to be very doubtful that commercialization is doing harm to the (majori-
ty of) consumers. Furthermore, a strange disbalance captures the attention: in virtually all are-
as of self-regulation, the German football league as well as its European counterpart runs a 
clearly pro-commercialization policy. A striking example includes the sale of broadcasting 
and streaming rights where the league employs (and abuses) its market power to maximize its 
revenues irrespective of negative effects on consumer welfare (Budzinski et al., 2019). 
 
2.4  Combating Excessive Indebtedness and Overinvestment  
A number of authors claim that professional football suffers from excessive indebtedness and 
systematic overinvestment  (Vöpel, 2011; Müller, Lammert, & Hovemann, 2012; Sass, 2012). 
Since investments into the ownership of clubs and teams rather represent a cure than a cause 
for indebtedness, a regulation limiting investment into ownership (in contrast to constraining 
borrowing) – at first glance – cannot contribute to combating excessive indebtedness. Howev-
er, it may assist the fight against overinvestment as – under certain assumptions – more in-
vestment into some clubs generates more investments by competing clubs, fueling a self-
reinforcing upward spiral of overinvestment by win-maximizing teams. Usually, such system-
atic overinvestment does not occur in markets due to corrective mechanisms (inter alia, com-
petition, lack of access to investment without realistic prospects, managerial rationalism, ac-
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counting and licensing standards, insolvency rules, etc.). For professional sports markets, 
some assumptions have been suggested that may cause systematic or at the least widespread 
overinvestment despite the limiting factors. These include gambler-style lottery incentives for 
managers (as an extreme type of over-confidence) combined with rat-race-type competition 
conditions (Vöpel, 2011; Müller et al., 2012). However, the conditions for these assumptions 
cannot be identified in real-world football markets, neither in theory nor empirically 
(Budzinski, 2014, 2018). Other assumptions with more empirical support include soft-budget 
constraints (Andreff, 2007; Storm & Nielsen, 2012), moral hazard problems from too-
prominent-to-fail phenomena (Budzinski, 2014), or taxpayer-financed bail-outs (zombie rac-
es; Franck, 2014). All of these issues point to problems with enforcing sound and effective 
insolvency rules, maybe in context with respective licensing conditions. Therefore, first-best 
solutions would address these regulations. Any contribution from one-sided ownership in-
vestment-limiting regulations is naturally limited, in particular since it creates trade-offs with 
potentially more dangerous borrowing amounts.  
Altogether, a financial investment-restricting regulation like the 50plus1-rule is inappropriate 
as long as incentives for over-investment are not addressed. Excessive indebtedness clearly 
refers to borrowed capital and not to equity/venture capital injected by investors buying team 
shares. Therefore, this line of reasoning is not pursued in our empirical analysis. Furthermore, 
we discount the integrity-of-sport reasoning because it is difficult to operationalize in terms of 
quantitative empirical analysis. However, we do not imply to deny its relevance or importance 
in doing so. Thus, we focus our analysis on the two remaining lines of reasoning for ineffi-
cient market outcomes: Growing financial imbalances jeopardizing competitive balance and 
increasing influence of external financial investors. 
 
3. Economic Effects of the 50plus1-Rule 
3.1  The Rule, Its Exceptions, and Its Enforcement 
The 50plus1-rule is an institution in the first and second major German Football league that 
regulates the ownership structure of participating teams (Becher & Burbach, 2018). Tradition-
ally, football teams in Germany are run by non-profit clubs, which organize themselves based 
upon membership, i.e. in sports clubs usually consisting of active athletes and supporters. 
With increasing professionalism and commercialization of the major football leagues, this 
structure was often viewed to be outdated and incapable of managing a multimillion-dollar 
business. Therefore, more and more clubs sought to outsource their football teams into incor-
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porated (commercial) subsidiaries of the club. Hence, for the 1998/99 season, the market-
internal regulator shaped regulations for teams becoming “real” corporate enterprises and, 
thus, for equity/venture capital investors, acquiring shares in the teams’ ownership (“Öffnung 
des Spielbetriebs der Lizenzligen für Kapitalgesellschaften”; (DFL, 2018)). However, the 
non-profit club historically running the team must keep owning at least 50 per cent of voting 
rights plus one additional vote (hence the name 50plus1) in the corporation now running the 
team (DFL, 2018). Consequently, investors can only acquire minority stakes in football teams 
of the two major German football leagues. The incorporation of teams appears in different 
variations in German law (GmbH, AG, KGaA)9 but the different types can be treated similar-
ly for our economic analysis. Note that the 50plus1-rule does not limit actual capital invest-
ments per se but regulates voting rights. However, voting rights and ownership of capital are, 
more often than not, closely related, so de facto it limits equity capital investment as well. For 
limited partnerships, the club must own 100 per cent of the general partner of the partnership 
and be empowered by law to behave as if they had the majority (Brüggemann, 2018). This 
explains how capital investments and voting shares can diverge, and do quite regularly (FC 
Augsburg, FC Ingolstadt, Hannover 96, RB Leipzig, TSV 1860 München; Bauers, Lammert, 
& Hovemann, 2015). The rule also prohibits multi-club ownership by limiting the number of 
corporations that a club can hold shares in to one. It is part of the constitution of the German 
Football League (Satzung des DFL e.V.; §16c), as well as the charter of the German Football 
Association (Satzung des DFB; §8), therefore it prevents clubs from participating in competi-
tion if they do not comply with this institution. 
However, the rule does not apply to every team in the competition as there are some legal 
exceptions. If the investment by a non-club (i.e. by an investor) into a team has been “contin-
uous and substantial” for more than 20 years10, the league allows this investor to acquire a 
majority share of the voting rights. Originally, this exemption related to two teams that, at the 
time of the introduction of the rule in the season 1998/99, were already owned by investors: 
Bayer 04 Leverkusen and VfL Wolfsburg, both historically financially supported by corpora-
tions outside of the sport as external investors (chemistry company Bayer AG and car-maker 
Volkswagen AG, respectively). In 2005, TSG 1899 Hoffenheim gained an exemption from 
the rule and was able to include its private investor Dietmar Hopp (co-founder of software 
                                                     
9  GmbH is the German version of a limited liability company without stock market access, whereas AG is a 
public limited company (with stock market access). KGaA is a limited joint-stock partnership. 
10  In the beginning of the regulation, the support was required to be previous to 1999. This extensional condi-
tion was abolished after a legal complaint by Martin Kind.  
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giant SAP) as a majority stakeholder in its football operations corporation. From 2017 on, 
Hannover 96 and it´s president Martin Kind (owner of a hearing aid device company) was in a 
sustained dispute with the league, after filing an application to be exempted from the rule. 
Finally, in 2019 Martin Kind and Hannover 96 withdrew their application after various legal 
proceedings (Spiegel Online, 2019). Other investors, like Hasan Ismaik (TSV 1860 München) 
are still legally fighting against the regulation. RB Leipzig represents a special case in ques-
tion. Drinks company Red Bull bought the Leipzig-based football club SSV Makranstädt, 
who was playing on amateur level outside the professional leagues and turned it into “Rasen-
Ballsport Leipzig”. On paper, it follows the rulebook by having this membership-based club 
running the team, however, the voting rights members of the club originally consisted solely 
of affiliates of Red Bull (there are currently still only 14 club members with voting rights, 
which however are said to be independent of Red Bull). Furthermore, the Bundesliga team is 
run by a limited liability company, in which the club has 1 per cent of the shares and Red Bull 
99 per cent. However, Red Bull waives a sufficient number of voting rights, so that the club 
keeps the majority of voting rights in the corporation running the team. Thus, it is controver-
sial whether RB Leipzig is plainly circumventing the 50plus1 rule and de facto represents an 
exception as well.  
 
3.2  Data and Descriptive Statistics  
In order to approach our research questions, we gathered data on teams of the Bundesliga. 
Specifically, we collected a unique longitudinal data set on 47 football teams in the first (ma-
jor) football league of Germany (Erste Bundesliga) from the season 1989/90 to the season 
2017/18. Along with our research purpose, we focus on players’ budget of the teams and 
points achieved in a season. All variables were measured by seasons. 
 
Variable Obs. Min. Max. Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Budget (infl) 396 €6.1 Mio. €262.2 Mio. €33.4 Mio €38.7 Mio €26.2 Mio 
Points (season) 432 18 91 44 46.66 13.4 
Tab.1, Descriptive overview of the dataset 
We track budget numbers from statements by clubs and official press releases by the league. 
These statements may contain estimations; however, the pre-season numbers do seem to 
match quite reliably with actual numbers ex post. Where no such official data was available, 
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we gathered professional estimations by experts in the field and sports journalists. We are 
aware of the limitations of these estimations. However, the DFL (German Football League) 
itself has corroborated the validity of these estimations (Wilkesmann, 2014). Seasons 1989/99 
through 2013/14 are based on data from the major German football magazine “kicker 
Sportmagazin” (Olympia Verlag). Values for the seasons 2013/14 until 2018/19 were com-
piled from various journalistic sources.11 
For the purpose of our analysis, we proxy a team´s budget by the monetary resources allocat-
ed to the player´s section of the team (“Lizenzspieleretat”). Premium payments and special 
bonuses are included in our budget numbers, but do not appear in player’s salary lists, hence 
do not stipulate the salary payments made to players (Randerath, 2018). Our budgets are an 
approximation of what clubs were planning in their internal cost calculations (as far as the 
limitations of our data go) and do not capture alterations during the season. These budgets are 
directed to players on the squad. They therefore exclude payments to trainers and other staff 
as well as investments in youth development programs. In addition, other streams of income 
for players, e.g. individual advertisement deals are not included. We reference gross pay-
ments. 
We are missing some data on budgets of at least some of the teams in 8 of 30 seasons.12 How-
ever, we observe steady and therefore predictable trends in budget development in the panel 
entities of teams where we have uninterrupted longitudinal data. Budgets do not vary errati-
cally across seasons and medians of budgets are largely consistent (see Figure 2). We adjusted 
these values for inflation, as to counteract inflation effects and make budgets across time more 
comparable. There is an upward and diverging trend in budgets over the seasons, even after 
adjusting for inflation. 
                                                     
11  Rother (2018) , Rheinische Post (2011), Rheinische Post (2018). 
12  We excluded data for the 1999/00 season completely, as this data´s source does not seem reliable and esti-
mated values erratically differ from all other seasons.  
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Fig. 2, Development of Budgets 
Upper and lower limits of boxes represent the 25%/75%-quartile, the median is plotted as a 
line within the box. Dots represent outliers according to a standard Tukey outlier definition of 
1.5IQR (Tukey, 1997).  
Sporting success is measured by points achieved by a team in a season. We have comprehen-
sive data without any missing values for all seasons of our panel, starting in 1994. We only 
use teams of the first German Bundesliga in our dataset because there is a large discontinuity 
in revenues between the first Bundesliga and lower leagues.13 Revenues from TV broadcast-
ing rights, ticket and merchandise sales drop off noticeably, which probably stems from focus 
of the fans on the highest championship race, team allocation advantages and superstar ef-
fects. 
 
3.3  Financial and Competitive Imbalance in the German Bundesliga  
In this section, we address our first two research questions: (i) did the 50plus1-rule reduce 
financial imbalances in the Bundesliga, and (ii) did it decrease competitive imbalance? We 
                                                     
13  For a discussion of the repercussions of inequality between first and second division, see Dietl, Franck, and 
Lang (2008). 
 
16 
 
evaluate the development of financial and sporting inequality across seasons by using stand-
ard measures of inequality within seasons (Pawlowski & Nalbantis, 2019). We consider 
team’s player budgets for a season as well as points scored by the end of the season (end-of-
season league outcomes, Owen & King, 2013). The measures of Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index 
(HHI) and Gini coefficients were computed from data of complete seasons that were available 
in the dataset (no missing values), as these rely on the completeness of information on all 
competitors and are not comparable otherwise (Kamerschen & Lam, 1975; Pawlowski, Breu-
er, & Hovemann, 2010). We exclude seasons with incomplete seasonal/panel data in this 
analysis.  
Measures of Financial Imbalances 
We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI; Hirschman, 1964) and Gini coefficients (Gini, 
1921) to measure financial imbalance.  
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Fig. 3, HHI of Budgets 
The HHI is the quadratic summation of all competitors market shares in an industry, and is 
defined as , where  is the market share of the  competitor as ex-
pressed in percentage of the whole market size (Depken, 1999). The HHI measures the con-
centration of an allocation towards the top players in a market; the higher its values are the 
more concentrated is a market. Here, this means that the concentration of budgets in favor of 
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the richest teams and thus financial imbalance significantly increased after the introduction of 
the 50plus1-rule (mean before intervention = 623.2; after = 732.0). After a slight downward 
trend in the 1990s, the HHI of budgets has increased every season after 2002/03. 
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Fig. 4, Gini Coefficients of Budgets 
The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion to represent and evaluate inequality 
of wealth in economies. Our analysis uses it to analyze inequality in the distribution of wealth 
in the Bundesliga.14 We observe a clear upward trend (a higher Gini coefficient signaling 
higher inequality) over the observed timeframe (mean before intervention = 0.1864; after = 
0.2699). Compare the development of the Gini coefficients to the work of Frick (2005), who 
found a similar development of team´s budgets in the years 1981–2003. In the following 
years, we observe a largely constant and considerable incline in financial imbalance among 
teams, especially after the introduction of the 50plus1-rule (from 1998/99 onwards).  
The Atkinson-Index is a similarly used inequality measure that allows for varying sensitivity 
to inequalities within the distributions (Atkinson, 1975). It implements a poverty aver-
sion/sensitivity parameter A(ε) which weighs the low end of the distribution more strongly in 
the result of the index. For our analysis, it indicates by its subgroups that the top part of the 
                                                     
14  Fort and Quirk (1995) and Schmidt (2001) use Gini coefficients to measure competitive balance. Since our 
analysis examines budgets, we apply it to monetary wealth. 
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wealth distribution accounts for more of the inequality in the league. Budgets among the rich-
est teams are a major driver of financial imbalance in Bundesliga because the index grows 
proportionally with increasing poverty sensitivity of the index A(ε). 
 
Season A(0.5) A(1) A(2) 
1989/1990 0.04192 0.08045 0.14733 
1990/1991 0.02746 0.05763 0.12670 
1996/1997 0.01948 0.03944 0.07940 
1998/1999 0.01821 0.03572 0.06830 
2001/2002 0.04450 0.08986 0.18370 
2002/2003 0.03120 0.06264 0.12525 
2006/2007 0.04920 0.09854 0.19180 
2007/2008 0.05564 0.10668 0.19360 
2009/2010 0.05212 0.09743 0.17059 
2010/2011 0.06864 0.12819 0.22211 
2011/2012 0.07238 0.13831 0.24955 
2013/2014 0.08832 0.16128 0.27054 
2015/2016 0.09252 0.16974 0.28797 
2018/2019 0.11229 0.19787 0.31106 
Tab. 2, Atkinson-Indexes 
All measures of financial imbalances show a clear/significant effect of growing budget imbal-
ance after the introduction of the 50plus1-rule. While the coincidence is obvious and empiri-
cally indisputable, deriving causation would require to control with other events taking place 
at the same time (see chapter 4). However, it can be concluded that the empirical picture 
shows no indication that the introduction of the 50plus1-rule has reduced financial imbalanc-
es. 
Measures of Competitive Imbalance 
In order to analyze the effect of the 50plus1-rule on sporting imbalance, i.e. competitive im-
balance, we again first look at the HHI. The maximum range of the HHI in a 18-Team league 
is defined by the value attained by a perfectly balanced league (lower limit) and a perfectly 
unbalanced league (upper limit), represented by the tightly dotted lines in Fig. 5 (Michie & 
Oughton, 2004). An increase in this index indicates a higher concentration of league points. 
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Fig. 5, HHI of Points15 
There is an observable trend of increasing concentration of sporting success, as measured by 
points in a season (mean before intervention = 584.95; after = 603.35). Values range from 
moderate concentration (in relation to the potential range of the index, below HHI = 600) to a 
semi-high concentration in the seasons after 2010. We do not observe any strong alteration to 
the general trend of concentration with the introduction of the regulative change in 
1998/1999. 
The H-Index of Competitive Balance (HICB) is the ratio of the HHI to the HHI of a perfectly 
balanced league (Depken, 1999; Pawlowski et al., 2010). It relates closely to the standard de-
viation of winning percentage (Scully, 1989; Quirk & Fort, 1992), which is typically used to 
measure competitive balance in American Sports Leagues, but is not very useful in European 
football leagues due to their 3-1-0 scoring system and the comparatively higher likelihood of 
draw games. The mean value of HICB across seasons before intervention was 105.29, after 
intervention 108.60 with no visible effect of the intervention. 
                                                     
15  We calculate the prediction from a linear regression on seasons and plot the resulting line (linear prediction 
plot). Residuals are distributed randomly. 
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Fig. 6, HICB 
The C5-Index of Competitive Balance analyses the seasonal points of the Top5 teams. A 
slight decrease in the trend of oligopolization after the intervention (2000/01) could be sus-
pected, only to continue after 2005/06 (mean before intervention =129.88; after = 137.40). 
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Fig. 7, CICB 
Altogether, no conclusive empirical picture emerges. The introduction of the 50plus1-rule did 
not stop the ongoing trend towards more competitive imbalance or just very temporarily. 
Again, alternative explanatory events would be required for conclusions about causation (see 
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chapter 4). However, there is no indication that the 50plus1-rule reduced competitive imbal-
ance. 
 
3.4  Distortive Effects on Competition?  
Our third research question, did the exemptions distort competition in favor of the exempted 
competitors, requires to differentiate between the performance of the “ordinary” teams, sub-
ject to the regulation, and the “exemption teams” with more scope for external investors. 
From this, we derive the following hypothesis: 
H1: Teams, which have an exception from the 50plus1-rule, differ systematically in their de-
velopment over time from clubs that fall under the rule.  
We use a Difference-in-Difference approach to estimate the effect of the intervention on 
team´s players’ budgets and sporting success. A Difference-in-Differences approach is espe-
cially useful when randomization on the individual level is not possible (natural experiment) 
and a commonly accepted econometric approach to treatment effect analysis. Since the partic-
ipating teams in the Bundesliga were non-randomly determined, we must rely on observation-
al data. We do not designate which entities get the treatment, however the data does clearly 
define the subpopulation that was exposed to the intervention.  
A Generalized Difference-in-Differences Approach 
Our model includes multiple pre- and post-treatment periods because the intervention of the 
50plus1-rule does not affect all entities at the same time. Therefore, we employ a generalized 
version of the Difference-in-Difference method. Not all exceptions were immediately granted 
with the introduction of the 50plus1-rule (varying pre-/post-treatment phases between enti-
ties). For instance, TSG 1899 Hoffenheim switched from the control group to the treatment 
group by gaining an exemption from the 50plus1-rule after not being subject to the interven-
tion from 1999 until 2015. For this specific DiD-analysis, we compare exemption clubs to all 
other clubs (which are subject to the rule).16 Clubs that have an exception from the 50plus1-
rule are in the treatment group, all other clubs constitute the control group. With regards to 
budgets, this leaves us with 30 clubs; three receiving the treatment of an exception from the 
rule at some point of the panel and 27 clubs without the treatment. Considering points, we 
observe 33 clubs respectively 30 without the treatment. 
                                                     
16  Clubs that run their teams without an intermediate corporation formally do not fall under the 50plus1-rule. 
However, due to their non-profit membership club character, they cannot take in equity investors at all. As 
such they are economically more similar to the intervention group than to the exemptions.  
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To adjust for a possible deviation from the parallel paths assumption, we use a DiD-approach 
with covariates. The methodological groundwork for this was proposed by Abadie (2005) and 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). We use a time fixed-effects and entity fixed-effects 
model. Our two-way fixed-effects model eliminates bias from unobservable variables that 
change over time but are constant over teams, and controls for factors, which differ across 
teams but are constant across seasons. The constant variables for entities, which correlate with 
the independent variable, are dropped. A fixed-effects model seems applicable to our case 
because we suspect many of the omitted variables to be time-invariant. For football teams, 
time-invariant effects with time-invariant values are likely: the location of a football team 
does not change over time (there is not a single re-location in our sample), as re-locations are 
not as frequent as in American sports leagues (Depken, 2016). The effect that a team´s home 
city has on the team is invariant across time and cities/regions develop rather slowly. The ef-
fect that management has on the team is rather constant and management of football teams 
tend to change rather slowly compared to individual talent (players on the team), or seasonal 
budgets. The financial resources of a team determine the ability to pay for talented players, 
therefore we assume that this also correlates with the ability to pay for talented coaches and 
athletic staff. We proxy past success by using the end-of-season points from the previous sea-
son because decisions on next season´s budget occur near the end of the previous season. 
Contrary to other Difference-in-Differences models, we use entity fixed-effects instead of 
group fixed-effects because teams are not specific to their group and change status over time. 
With the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we establish that the differences in coefficients are sys-
tematic; therefore, we reject the Hausman's null that the differences are non-systematic and 
choose a fixed-effects model.  
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 is the Difference-in-Differences estimator, an interaction term of the dummy variables of 
the treatment vs. control group status of team i in period t, (making it subject to the 
treatment) and the team i being subjected to the intervention of the 50plus1-rule in t. 
 
,where  is the average estimated effect of the treatment of an exception from the rule. 
Moreover, we apply a similar approach to seasonal points of teams. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a third model (3), we interact the effect of the treatment with the budget of the team, and 
use sporting success as an independent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We acknowledge the limitations of the Difference-in-Differences approach. The parallel paths 
assumption is a rather strong assumption and method-oriented literature has proposed solu-
tions for non-conformance with it (Abadie, 2005; Lechner, 2010; Callaway & Sant’Anna, 
2018; Chan & Kwok, 2018; Maier-Rigaud & Sudaric, 2019). We support the parallel paths 
assumption for our data as we observe reasonably similar trends (note: not similar outcomes) 
among the control group and the treatment group (see Fig. 2) before the intervention. The 
deviation from the parallel path (e.g. by FC Bayern München) occurs only after the interven-
tion and is therefore included in the estimation of the effect of non-treatment. Serial correla-
tion of dependent variables is a standard limitation in Difference-in-Differences estimations 
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(Bertrand et al. 2004). Our inference draws from a considerably long time series (30 years), 
which raises the likelihood of serial correlation. Furthermore, our dependent variables of 
league points in a season and players budget are serially correlated because, as we find in our 
results, past success breeds future success (see results). Considering the Stable Unit Treatment 
Assumption (SUTVA; Rubin, 1986), there might be spillover effects of the treatment from the 
treatment group to the control group. If treatment clubs raise their budgets, control clubs like-
ly try to keep up by also elevating their budget as they compete for the same end-of-season 
positions and players’ talent.  
Our control group consists of clubs with a corporation running the commercial football busi-
ness and such without. For our analysis, we assume that this spillover affects all entities at the 
same intensity. It is possible that clubs at the lower end of the budget hierarchy are more af-
fected by this spillover because lower revenue clubs are more likely to have maintained the 
non-corporate legal status. Non-corporate clubs achieve an average (mean) of 41.8 points in a 
season with an average budget of €28.8 Mio., where corporate clubs achieve 49.1 points with 
an average €45 Mio. In 13 out of 17 seasons17, more than half of the non-profit membership 
clubs had a budget below that seasons’ average.18  If anything, the effect of the non-treatment 
is overestimated by this identification strategy, making the intervention of the 50plus1 rule 
more efficacious than its truly is. Overall, the limitations of the Difference-in-Differences 
approach do not invalidate our conclusions.  
                                                     
17  Due to limitations of our data, only 17 seasons allowed for such a statement. 
18  Relative spending is of higher importance than absolute spending, with an efficient player´s market (Leach & 
Szymanski, 2015). 
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Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Budgets Points in Season Points in Season 
    
    
Exception = 1 -13.80 5.974*** -2.196 
 (0.116) (0.0004) (0.561) 
 -31.23 - 3.617 2.844 - 9.104 -9.801 - 5.409 
 (8.518) (1.542) 
 
(3.746) 
Budget in Season - 0.157*** 
(0.000) 
0.152*** 
(0.000) 
  0.0880 - 0.227 0.0868 - 0.217 
  (0.0342) (0.0320) 
    
Points in Previous Season 0.566** - - 
 (0.0301)   
 0.0583 - 1.074   
 (0.248)   
    
Exception#Budget - - 0.163** 
(0.0306) 
0.0162 - 0.311 
 (0.0725) 
    
Constant -3.775 45.20*** 45.31*** 
 (15.91) (0) (0) 
 -36.32 - 28.77 41.38 - 49.03 41.50 - 49.12 
 (0.814) (1.882) (1.875) 
    
Observations 268 329 329 
R-squared 0.373 0.345 0.117 
Number of Teams 30 36 36 
P-values, Robust SE in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tab. 3, Results 
 
These results use robust standard errors to account for autocorrelation between the pre/post-
periods of the same entity (Eicker, 1967; White, 1980). We acknowledge that we do face en-
dogeneity of these variables. In model (1), we do not find a significant effect of an exception 
from the 50plus1-rule on budgets (p-value , 95% CI = . Having an 
exception from the 50plus1-rule appears to be, contrary to some parts of literature (see chapter 
2), not a guaranteed way for clubs to gain a financial edge on competitors. According to mod-
el (2), however, an exception from the rule does have a significant positive effect on sporting 
success, measured by points on the season (p-value , 95% CI . 
Also, budgets have a positive significant effect on the points in the season (p-value 
, 95% CI = ). Also, points in the previous season significantly and 
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positively influence budget in the following season (p-value , 95% CI = 
).19  
In model (3), the negative coefficient for the effect of budgets on points cannot be interpreted 
reliably, because the interaction term of budgets and the intervention influences the coeffi-
cient for the effect. The negative coefficient is not statistically significant and is in line with 
the positive significant coefficient for budgets in model (2). In order to interpret the interac-
tion term of budgets and having an exemption from the 50plus1-rule, a average marginal ef-
fects approach is employed. In the interaction of budgets and having an exemption from the 
50plus1-rule, we observe a trend (see Fig. 8). With an increase in the budget of a team, the 
differences from having an exemption from the rule increase significantly. This effect is sta-
tistically significant as all 95%-CI for all values in the sample are above zero. Being subject to 
the 50plus1-rule or having an exception matters more for higher budget teams. Therefore, we 
can infer a distortion of competition by the rule as it affects smaller clubs significantly less 
than bigger clubs. Based on our empirical evidence and theoretical groundwork on the pay-
performance relationship, it could be suspected that this influences sporting success as well. 
Having an exception from the 50plus1-rule does influence sporting success positively. There-
fore, a higher efficiency of budget use/resource spending seems to appear in exempted clubs 
than in non-exempted clubs. 
                                                     
19  Our results support the well-established pay-performance relation (Forrest and Simmons (2002); Franck and 
Nüesch (2011)), where investments into players in previous periods (as well as in the same period) correlate 
with the placing within the championship race.  
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Fig. 8, Average Marginal Effects of an Exception 
 
4. Implications  
RQ1 and 2: Does the 50plus1-rule reduce financial and competitive imbalances? 
In our analysis of inequality in budgets and points, we find a low number of high budget 
teams with an increasing upward trend and a high number of relatively low to medium budget 
teams which are persistently stagnating when adjusted for inflation. Both financial imbalance 
and competitive imbalance have been constantly increasing during the last 20 years with this 
trend being more concise for the increasing inequality of budgets than for the inequality of 
points allocation (see chapters 3.2 and 3.3). In the more recent seasons, this development cor-
relates with sporting dominance by FC Bayern München who enjoys a substantially (multiple 
times) higher budget than every other club and won all Bundesliga seasons since 2012. We do 
not find empirical evidence that the 50plus1-rule prevents or reduces financial or competitive 
imbalances. Quite in contrast, the introduction of the investment-limiting rule coincides with a 
change in the trend of budget allocation from budgets getting more equal before the rule came 
into force to budgets becoming increasingly unequal after it (see chapter 3.2). Furthermore, 
the introduction of the rule has no visible reducing effect on competitive imbalance (see chap-
ter 3.3).  
However, we cannot conclude from our analysis that the 50plus1-rule causes the change in 
trend and is a major factor in the growing inequality. Instead, the regime switch from an equal 
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distribution of TV money to a mixed system with a considerable share of a performance-
related allocation of these common revenues (starting with the 2000/2001 season) may be 
another candidate for being a driver of inequality. Notwithstanding, it would be speculative to 
conclude that the 50plus1-rule has alleviated the trend towards inequality in the face of other 
forces. If at all, such an effect appears to be minimal. Furthermore, given the severity of the 
intervention (effectively restricting the freedom of business), our analysis very clearly shows 
that limiting financial and competitive imbalances must be addressed by other means. An ob-
vious choice could be the allocation scheme of common revenues like television/media mon-
ey (Budzinski 2018) or the cartel-like structure of selling media rights (Budzinski, Gaenssle, 
& Kunz-Kaltenhäuser 2019). Eventually, higher placement in the league gives teams access to 
international competitions. Places one to four directly qualify for the UEFA Champions 
League, the national cup winner ("DFB-Pokal") and the fifth place league finisher qualify for 
the UEFA Europa League, and the sixth place finisher gets to attend the Europa League quali-
fication play-offs (DFL, 2019). These international competitions yield considerable revenues 
from, inter alia, international broadcasting rights and additional ticket and merchandise 
sales.20 Access to international competition brings an advantage to high placing teams that 
other competitors cannot enjoy, further fueling an uneven playing field in the following time 
periods. 
In summary, the financial imbalances are market-internal and caused by institutions that 
league itself enforces on the competition, and not by any market failure.  
RQ3: Does the 50plus1-rule distort competition? 
Our empirical analysis reveals conclusive indication that the exceptions to the 50plus1-rule 
distort competition within the league. Thus, the 50plus1-regulation falls short of the goal of 
the market-internal regulator to establish an investment regulation that is neutral to competi-
tion. This result is hardly surprising as putting competitors from the same league under differ-
ent investment regulations clearly violates the notion of a competitive level-playing field. 
Thus, a minimum implication of our analysis is to abolish the exemptions from the 50plus1-
rule and withstand the lobbyism of incumbent beneficiaries of investor ownership like Bayer 
Leverkusen or VfL Wolfsburg. If a restrictive rule on investment can be justified at all, it 
must be non-discriminatory and must not contain tailormade exceptions. The complex condi-
                                                     
20  In the 2003 season, the total amount of payouts to participating clubs in the UEFA Champions League, 
UEFA Europa League and UEFA Super Cup amounted to €549m (UEFA 2005). Compare that to the 2019 
season, where the officially estimated payouts are four to five-fold (€2.55bn) (UEFA, 2019). 
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tions for granting new exemptions may be the same for everyone on paper, but are difficult to 
understand regarding its properties in any different context than incumbent protection. Obvi-
ously, next to abolishing the exemptions, abandoning 50lpus1 as a whole would also erase the 
distortive effects from the regulation. 
On the international level like in UEFA’s Champions League and Europa League, German 
clubs may experience an loss of competitiveness (Drut & Raballand, 2012; Budzinski & Mül-
ler, 2013). The teams may be at a disadvantage through the limitations of their economic in-
vestment behavior, imposed on them by their domestic league, since most other European 
Leagues (except for France; Andreff, 2007) do not limit external investments. Empirical stud-
ies support this conjecture (Drut & Raballand, 2012). If international competitiveness matters, 
either an UEFA-wide solution (without exemptions) or abolishment represents sound solu-
tions. 
Does it prevent influence of external investors? 
At first glance, the 50plus1-rule succeeds in preventing “external” influence by investors. 
However, external investors can still hold more than 50 per cent of capital shares in the corpo-
ration, if they accept an underrepresentation in voting shares (Bauers, Lammert, & 
Hovemann, 2015). Next to the formal influence by exercising voting rights, investors enjoy 
informal influence due to the dependency of the team’s budget on the investor (Bauers et al., 
2015). For example, Martin Kind holds the majority share of capital in the adjoining legal 
parties of the club (other than the players stock corporation; ~53 per cent of the financing 
Hannover 96 Sales & Service GmbH & Co. KG21, ) and was chief executive of the private 
social club Hannover 96 e. V. for over 20 years. His economic influence is evident, even 
though the DFL denied his application to gain an exception from 50plus1 repeatedly. Fur-
thermore, even with low voting influence other shareholders (e.g. officials and fans) might act 
opportunistically and mirror the opinion of the investor to prevent him/her from withdrawing 
his/her investments. So an influence exceeding the official voting rights must be suspected – 
and is only natural. Everyone who gives significant money injections will gain influence; this 
is the same for sponsors. In other words, at the end of the day professional football must de-
cide whether it wants to enjoy big and growing budgets or not. In the first case, it will always 
be the case that various wealthy players gain influence, in the latter case, budget caps provide 
a more direct and less distortive instruments than the ambivalent 50plus1-rule. In any case, a 
distinction between “internal” and “external” budget growth or investment is not helpful and 
                                                     
21  See Bauers et al. (2015). 
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protectionist as well as discriminatory by nature. It seeks to protect the anticompetitive rents 
of the insiders and restrict competitive market entry from outsiders.  
 
5. Conclusion  
The 50plus1-rule limits investment into a majority of commercial football teams in Germany 
by limiting the voting rights for the investors. A number of teams, however, are exempted 
from the rule due to various reasons. Our theoretical analysis (chapter 2) casts doubt on 
whether the 50plus1-rule is an adequate tool to achieve the goals it intends to. These doubts 
are further corroborated by our empirical analysis (chapter 3) that displays no indication for 
balancing effects of the 50plus1-rule. Neither financial nor competitive imbalance has been 
reduced since the implementation of the investment-restricting rule; quite in contrast, both 
have significantly increased since then. While other driving forces may be responsible for the 
increasing inequality, there is no empirical indication that the 50plus1-rule was effective in 
limiting such a development. Combined with the severity of its intervention into the freedom 
of business and the theoretical doubts on both its effectiveness and efficiency, we cannot de-
rive a justification for the existence of the 50plus1-rule from our analysis.  
Moreover, the rule itself is likely to cause distortions to competition. Next to disadvantaging 
German football teams in international competitions (as the other European countries have no 
such investment limiting rules), the exemptions that are inherent to the 50plus1-rule cause 
anticompetitive concerns. Teams not restricted by the rules should enjoy a competitive ad-
vantage over their rule-bound competitors. Our empirical analysis reveals indication of distor-
tive effects within the league. Consequently, the rule, as it is, must be classified to be anti-
competitive.  
The within-league anticompetitive effects of the 50plus1-rule may be alleviated by discarding 
the exemptions (as well as by closing loopholes). However, while this would re-create a level-
playing field for the teams in terms of investment-intake, even such a general 50plus1-rule 
without exemptions may exert an undesired anticompetitive effect by conserving and cement-
ing the existing financial imbalances within the league. Differences in budgets are ever-
increasing and the distance between few top teams and the rest has become so large that it 
cannot be realistically bridged by any team anymore without considerable catching-up in-
vestments. Limiting investment-intake, thus, takes away the probably only option for midfield 
teams to ever compete on equal sporting terms with the top teams. In other words, a sporting 
level-playing field is destroyed because of the path-dependency of past success and future 
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budgets, a natural phenomenon further fueled by other market-internal institutions like the 
unequal allocation of common revenues among the teams (Budzinski, 2018).  
In summary, if financial and competitive imbalances shall be addressed by the market-internal 
regulator (the league), then institutions like the 50plus1-rule do not represent an effective and 
efficient avenue. Instead, institutions like revenue distribution schemes or budget and salary 
caps represent more promising ways. 
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Appendix 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Budgets Points in Season Points in Season 
VARIABLES    
    
Exception = 1 -13.80 5.974*** -2.196 
 (8.518) (1.542) (3.746) 
 -31.23 - 3.617 2.844 - 9.104 -9.801 - 5.409 
 (0.116) (0.000447) (0.561) 
    
Points in Previous Season 0.566**   
 (0.248) - - 
 0.0583 - 1.074   
 (0.0301)   
    
Budget - 0.157*** 0.152*** 
  (0.0342) (0.0320) 
  0.0880 - 0.227 0.0868 - 0.217 
  (5.30e-05) (3.51e-05) 
Exception#Budget_infl_Mio - - 0.163** 
   (0.0725) 
   0.0162 - 0.311 
   (0.0306) 
    
Season = 2, 1990/1991    
 - - - 
    
    
Season = 5, 1993/1994    
 - - . 
    
    
Season = 6, 1994/1995    
 - - . 
    
    
Season = 7, 1995/1996    
 - - . 
    
    
Season = 8, 1996/1997 - 0.00332 0.0515 
  (3.130) (3.145) 
  -6.352 - 6.358 -6.332 - 6.435 
  (0.999) (0.987) 
Season = 9, 1997/1998 25.81*** -5.850* -5.605 
 (4.802) (3.400) (3.447) 
 15.98 - 35.63 -12.75 - 1.053 -12.60 - 1.392 
 (8.97e-06) (0.0942) (0.113) 
Season = 10, 1998/1999 35.76*** -8.779** -8.624** 
 (5.709) (3.885) (3.821) 
 24.08 - 47.44 -16.67 - -0.892 -16.38 - -0.866 
 (7.75e-07) (0.0302) (0.0304) 
Season = 11, 1999/2000  (0.734)  
  1.897  
  (5.643)  
  -9.915 - 13.71  
Season = 12, 2000/2001 24.38*** -4.028 -3.598 
 (5.573) (2.700) (2.762) 
 12.98 - 35.78 -9.508 - 1.453 -9.206 - 2.009 
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 (0.000144) (0.145) (0.201) 
Season = 13, 2001/2002 31.97*** -5.654* -5.276* 
 (6.438) (2.882) (2.927) 
 18.80 - 45.13 -11.51 - 0.197 -11.22 - 0.666 
 (2.79e-05) (0.0578) (0.0801) 
Season = 14, 2002/2003 20.00*** -5.494** -5.301** 
 (4.927) (2.440) (2.450) 
 9.925 - 30.08 -10.45 - -0.540 -10.27 - -0.327 
 (0.000340) (0.0307) (0.0374) 
Season = 15, 2003/2004 38.87*** -15.47*** -15.27*** 
 (6.209) (2.629) (2.603) 
 26.17 - 51.56 -20.81 - -10.13 -20.56 - -9.989 
 (7.83e-07) (1.10e-06) (1.15e-06) 
Season = 16, 2004/2005 24.24*** -2.481 -2.312 
 (8.361) (3.841) (3.902) 
 7.142 - 41.34 -10.28 - 5.316 -10.23 - 5.609 
 (0.00706) (0.523) (0.557) 
Season = 17, 2005/2006 18.42*** -9.224** -9.152** 
 (6.241) (4.160) (4.156) 
 5.658 - 31.19 -17.67 - -0.779 -17.59 - -0.715 
 (0.00620) (0.0332) (0.0343) 
Season = 18, 2006/2007 10.11* -3.253 -2.810 
 (5.428) (3.935) (4.049) 
 -0.996 - 21.21 -11.24 - 4.736 -11.03 - 5.411 
 (0.0728) (0.414) (0.492) 
Season = 19, 2007/2008 12.62* -3.475 -2.937 
 (6.283) (3.374) (3.578) 
 -0.234 - 25.47 -10.32 - 3.374 -10.20 - 4.327 
 (0.0540) (0.310) (0.417) 
Season = 20, 2008/2009 17.65*** -5.585* -5.476* 
 (5.960) (3.142) (3.181) 
 5.459 - 29.84 -11.96 - 0.794 -11.93 - 0.982 
 (0.00606) (0.0842) (0.0940) 
Season = 21, 2009/2010 17.69** -5.474* -5.281 
 (7.111) (3.229) (3.326) 
 3.146 - 32.23 -12.03 - 1.081 -12.03 - 1.472 
 (0.0189) (0.0989) (0.121) 
Season = 22, 2010/2011 20.69** -3.829 -3.693 
 (7.698) (3.041) (3.130) 
 4.945 - 36.43 -10.00 - 2.344 -10.05 - 2.661 
 (0.0118) (0.216) (0.246) 
Season = 23, 2011/2012 20.80** -5.840* -5.654* 
 (8.180) (2.988) (3.011) 
 4.073 - 37.53 -11.91 - 0.227 -11.77 - 0.458 
 (0.0166) (0.0587) (0.0687) 
Season = 24, 2012/2013 24.95** -4.189 -4.007 
 (9.500) (3.292) (3.273) 
 5.519 - 44.38 -10.87 - 2.495 -10.65 - 2.637 
 (0.0136) (0.212) (0.229) 
Season = 25, 2013/2014 28.29*** -5.087 -4.885 
 (10.10) (3.291) (3.279) 
 7.629 - 48.95 -11.77 - 1.595 -11.54 - 1.772 
 (0.00899) (0.131) (0.145) 
Season = 26, 2014/2015 36.56*** -6.488 -6.972 
 (12.25) (4.560) (4.424) 
 11.50 - 61.62 -15.75 - 2.770 -15.95 - 2.010 
 (0.00573) (0.164) (0.124) 
Season = 27, 2015/2016 36.50*** -7.853** -8.060** 
 (12.56) (3.204) (3.133) 
 10.81 - 62.20 -14.36 - -1.350 -14.42 - -1.700 
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 (0.00695) (0.0194) (0.0145) 
Season = 28, 2016/2017 31.86*** -8.006*** -7.871*** 
 (10.53) (2.456) (2.466) 
 10.33 - 53.39 -12.99 - -3.021 -12.88 - -2.864 
 (0.00515) (0.00248) (0.00299) 
    
Season = 29, 2017/2018 - - - 
    
    
    
Season = 30, 2018/2019 57.07*** -11.76*** 55.77*** 
 (18.44) (4.015) (19.83) 
 19.36 - 94.78 -19.91 - -3.608 15.22 - 96.32 
 (0.00433) (0.00595) (0.00872) 
    
Constant -3.775 45.20*** 45.31*** 
 (15.91) (1.882) (1.875) 
 -36.32 - 28.77 41.38 - 49.03 41.50 - 49.12 
 (0.814) (0) (0) 
    
Observations 268 329 329 
R-squared 0.373 0.345 0.117 
Number of Teamnr 30 36 36 
    
Robust se, pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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